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The Dynamic Reactance Interaction –
How Vested Interests Affect People’s
Experience, Behavior, and Cognition
in Social Interactions
Christina Steindl* and Eva Jonas
Department of Psychology, Social Psychology, University of Salzburg, Salzburg, Austria
In social interactions, individuals may sometimes pursue their own interests at the
expense of their interaction partner. Such self-interested behaviors impose a threat
to the interaction partner’s freedom to act. The current article investigates this threat
in the context of interdependence and reactance theory. We explore how vested
interests influence reactance process stages of an advisor–client interaction. We aim
to explore the interactional process that evolves. In two studies, participants took the
perspective of a doctor (advisor) or a patient (client). In both studies we incorporated a
vested interest. In Study 1 (N = 82) we found that in response to a vested interest of
their interaction partner, patients indicated a stronger experience of reactance, more
aggressive behavioral intentions, and more biased cognitions than doctors. A serial
multiple mediation revealed that a vested interest engendered mistrust toward the
interaction partner and this mistrust led to an emerging reactance process. Study 2
(N = 207) further demonstrated that doctors expressed their reactance in a subtle
way: they revealed a classic confirmation bias when searching for additional information
on their preliminary decision preference, indicating stronger defense motivation. We
discuss how these findings can help us to understand how social interactions develop
dynamically.
Keywords: social interaction, vested interest, mistrust, experience of reactance, aggressive behavioral intentions,
biased cognitions, information search
INTRODUCTION
Buying a coﬀee at the bakery, chatting with a colleague at the oﬃce, meeting a friend, talking to
the neighbors. . . Every single day we interact with people. These interactions require at least two
persons who act, react, and in doing so, inﬂuence each other. Most of our daily interactions are
easy-going. Imagine for example that Mr. Smith is ill and consults Dr. Boston for advice about
possible treatment options. The doctor informs Mr. Smith about the advantages and disadvantages
of possible medications and listens carefully while he describes his situation and states his needs
and fears. Mr. Smith gets a prescription for his preferred medication, thanks the doctor for her
advice and feels understood and appreciated. This example demonstrates how positive actions
lead to positive responses and further positive actions. Consequently a favorable and trustful
relationship-loop can develop.
However, interactions do not always run that smoothly. For various reason they sometimes
develop negatively and the positive relationship-loop changes into a conﬂict-loop. Getting back
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to our doctor–patient example, imagine that Dr. Boston
ﬁnancially beneﬁts from selling a speciﬁc kind of medication, e.g.,
a depot injection. She overrides the patient’s wishes and needs,
talks him into believing that the injection is best for him and
reacts with harsh rejection to any other decision. As the doctor
is only interested in his own ﬁnancial beneﬁt, the patient might
fear that he may get a wrong medication and may therefore
experience a realistic threat, such as an actual danger to his
health (see Stephan and Stephan, 2000). However, the doctor’s
vested interest can pose an additional threat because the patient
may experience a threat to his freedom to decide for himself.
The experience of a freedom threat can also happen without
any realistic threat present. Imagine for example that not the
doctor but the patient would ﬁnancially beneﬁt from being sold
the depot injection because he collaborated with the company
which produced the depot. Although the doctor would neither
be threatened economically, nor in his health or safety, he could
experience the patient’s vested interest as a threat to his freedom.
This was demonstrated in an experiment by Wicklund et al.
(1970). Participants were asked to rate six pairs of sunglasses
and to choose one pair to model in front of a television camera.
The chosen pair could then be purchased for half price. Before
participants tried the glasses on, the salesperson either said “If
you want to buy a pair, I’ll be glad to handle it, since I get a
50% cut oﬀ all orders” (vested interest condition) or “I really
don’t care whether you buy a pair or not since I don’t get
anything from it, but I will be glad to handle the order if you
do decide to buy them” (control condition). As participants tried
the glasses on, the salesperson pressured them toward a positive
evaluation by saying “Those are made for you,” “Those are great.”
Findings indicated that the sunglasses were rated lower in the
vested interest compared to the control condition. The authors
argued that the self-interested behavior of the salesperson created
a pressure to buy and thus, as a consequence a desire to maintain
the freedom not to purchase any pair arose.
The consequences of social inﬂuence attempts like those
have been well-explored in research on reactance theory. The
theory demonstrates that threats to our freedom to decide for
ourselves can lead to a state of motivational arousal with the
aim to restore the freedom. This state is known as psychological
reactance and has been found to result in diﬀerent reactance
eﬀects. Thus, people show for example aggressive behaviors or
biased cognitions such as a devaluation of the imposed object and
the threatening person (for an overview on reactance theory, see
Brehm, 1966; Brehm and Brehm, 1981; Miron and Brehm, 2006;
Steindl et al., 2015).
The aim of the current paper is to improve our understanding
of how threats in social interactions lead to conﬂict loops, i.e.,
why social inﬂuence attempts resulting from vested interests
are perceived as threats to freedom and how they lead to the
experience of reactance resulting in cognitive and behavioral
consequences. We propose a “Loop2Loop model of social
interactions” (Jonas, 2015; Jonas and Bierhoﬀ, in press; Jonas and
Steindl, 2015), which builds on interdependence theory (Thibaut
and Kelley, 1959; Kelley and Thibaut, 1978; Kelley et al., 2003; for
an overview see Van Lange and Rusbult, 2011; Van Lange, 2012)
and subdivides the interaction process into its single stages. In
the present studies we investigate how vested interests in social
interactions aﬀect people’s perception of the interaction partner
and their subsequent reactions with regard to: (a) their experience
of threat, (b) their behavioral intentions, and (c) their cognitions.
By analyzing the single stages of the social interaction, which
are characteristic for reactance processes, we aim to explain how
vested interests shape people’s sequential series of reactions to the
threat. In the following paper we refer to this as the “dynamic
interaction” between two individuals. This means that in an
interaction, person A’s behavior aﬀects person B’s reactions, those
again aﬀect person A’s reactions, and so forth.
Interdependence Theory
Social inﬂuence attempts, such as health campaigns or clinical
advice, are sometimes perceived as threats to our freedom
to decide on our own (e.g., Grandpre et al., 2003; Dillard
and Shen, 2005; Silvia, 2005). Those threats often happen in
social interactions where one or more persons limit a speciﬁc
freedom of another person. To understand why and how such
negative interactions develop, interdependence theory (Thibaut
and Kelley, 1959; Kelley and Thibaut, 1978; Kelley et al.,
2003; for an overview see Van Lange and Rusbult, 2011; Van
Lange, 2012) may help. Interdependence theory speciﬁes the
characteristics of a social exchange situation in which two or
more persons are interdependently related to each other. It
mainly focuses on the costs and beneﬁts (outcomes) of social
interactions.
Interdependence means that the outcomes of the interaction
are inﬂuenced not only by one’s own behaviors (actor control)
but also by the behaviors of the interaction partner (partner
control) and by the cooperative behavior of the two partners
(joint control). In terms of the theory, we can describe an
interaction as a situation in which two people depend on each
other with regard to the fulﬁllment of their needs, thoughts,
motives, and behaviors. The more dependent person (high
partner control) is likely to sacriﬁce or accommodate. The less
dependent person (low partner control) holds greater power
over the other person and threats and coercions are possible
(see Van Lange and Rusbult, 2011). For example, Dr. Boston is
dependent on the patient’s ﬁnal choice because she would receive
a ﬁnancial beneﬁt from selling the speciﬁc brand of injection to
her patient. However, she is less dependent on the patient than
vice versa. This could lead the doctor to force the patient to
choose the injection. The patient, on the other hand, probably
relies even more on the doctor’s behavior (high partner control)
than vice versa because he does not have the necessary medical
expertise to know which medication is best for him to relieve
his symptoms. If the doctor would try “to force” the patient to
choose a speciﬁc brand of injection, the patient may experience
an even stronger feeling of having been threatened, especially if
he feels he greatly depends on the doctor’s behavior. In this case,
the patient may experience an even stronger threat in response
to the doctor’s attempt to inﬂuence him compared to a situation
in which the patient was less dependent on the doctor’s advice.
This asymmetric level of dependence, which means that one
interaction partner relies more on the other and thus, is subject
to a higher partner control, not only aﬀects people’s satisfaction
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with the interaction (e.g., Kelley et al., 2003) but further aﬀects
their emotional and motivational experience, their cognitions,
and behaviors. If the doctor would persuade the patient to take
the depot injection, how would the highly dependent patient feel
in this situation? And how would those feelings further aﬀect his
reactions?
A Dynamic Model of Social Interaction:
The Loop2Loop Model
Our “Loop2Loop model of social interaction” (Jonas, 2015; Jonas
and Bierhoﬀ, in press; Jonas and Steindl, 2015) describes a
dynamic interaction process between two or more persons and
how their behaviors mutually aﬀect each other (Figure 1). It
builds on the SABI model of interdependence theory (Kelley
et al., 2003) in which the interaction (I) is a function of two
interacting persons’ (A and B) needs, thoughts, motives, and
behaviors, and the characteristics of the situation (S): I = f (A,
B, S). The Loop2Loop Model sets a strong focus on people’s
motives inﬂuencing people’s motivation for the actual interaction.
They give rise to the emerging motivational-aﬀective state, the
motivated cognitions, and motivated behaviors. These eﬀects
create a dynamic development of social interactions which
means that the behavior of one person aﬀects the experience,
behaviors, and cognitions of another person which in turn
aﬀect the ﬁrst person and so forth. Therefore, the Loop2Loop
model extends the SABI model by explaining how interactions
dynamically develop over time. For example, trusting behaviors
such as honesty or reliability create a trustworthy atmosphere
further arousing a feeling of one’s motives being in good hands.
The relationship-loop can develop in a favorable way. On the
contrary, untrustworthy behaviors such as cheating or lying
threaten one’s motives, arouse a feeling of being threatened and
lead to negative cognitions about the interaction partner which
further creates a conﬂict-loop. Jodlbauer and Jonas (2011), for
example, found that clients who recognized self-interested cues
of advisors perceived the advisors as less trustworthy which in
turn decreased their willingness to accept the recommendation.
If we would take any further, this could in turn threaten the
advisor’s motivation to sell a product and thus, could trigger
anger and even aggressive behavior in the advisor. When
integrating this example into the Loop2Loop model, we have
the advisor’s self-interested behavior in one loop and the client’s
resistant behavior (refusal of the recommendation) in the other
loop. What about the motivation and cognition in-between?
Why do situations involving self-interested behaviors often elicit
resistance?
Vested Interest, Reactance, and Mistrust
Think back to the doctor–patient example in which Dr. Boston
tries to persuade her patient to take the depot injection. How
would the patient react? Research in the context of persuasion
has shown that persuasive attempts, for example, trying to
convince a person of a speciﬁc opinion or product often fail to
produce their desired eﬀects. Rather, they often lead to the exact
opposite attitude or behavior. Several studies found psychological
reactance to be a possible explanation for these failures (e.g.,
Worchel and Brehm, 1970; Heller et al., 1973; Dillard and Shen,
2005; Kim et al., 2013; Rains, 2013): Perceived intent to persuade
FIGURE 1 | Loop2Loop model of social interactions (Jonas and Bierhoff, in press).
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is often perceived as a threat to one’s freedom to decide for
oneself leading to a motivation to restore one’s freedom called
psychological reactance (Brehm, 1966).
Reactance consists of an aﬀective, as well as a cognitive and
a behavioral component. Miron and Brehm (2006) deﬁned the
aﬀective component of reactance as one’s subjective experience
(feeling) that accompanies the urge to restore freedom. This
subjective experience was speciﬁed as the experience of
uncomfortable, hostile, and aggressive feelings (Brehm, 1966;
Brehm and Brehm, 1981), but also as anger aﬀect (Dillard and
Shen, 2005). Other research combined the extent to which one
perceived a situation as a freedom threat with one’s emotional
experience (e.g., frustrated, annoyed, oﬀended) to assess the
subjective experience of reactance (Traut-Mattausch et al., 2008,
2011; Jonas et al., 2009; Sittenthaler et al., 2015; Niesta-Kayser
et al., submitted). Dillard and Shen (2005) demonstrated that
reactance not only consists of aﬀect but also of cognitions. In their
persuasion research, they focused on negative cognitions such as
counterarguments or derogation of the source of threat. Another
cognitive indicator of reactance used in various reactance studies,
is the change in attractiveness which means that people upgrade
a restricted but downgrade an imposed message or product
(e.g., Brehm, 1966; Bushman and Stack, 1996; Fitzsimons and
Lehmann, 2004; Dillard and Shen, 2005; Rains and Turner,
2007; Bijvank et al., 2009; Laurin et al., 2012; Rains, 2013).
The behavioral component of reactance is often described as
the execution of the restricted behavior. In addition, forcing the
threatening agent to remove the threat or behaving in a hostile
and aggressive way (Brehm, 1966; Brehm and Brehm, 1981;
Miron and Brehm, 2006) represents the behavioral component.
However, these reactance eﬀects only emerge if two conditions
are met. First, only if people expect to have a certain freedom of
choice, reactance can occur (Brehm, 1966; Brehm and Sensenig,
1966; Clee and Wicklund, 1980). Imagine the patient again, who
expects to receive an advice from Dr. Boston but still expects
being able to decide what is best for him. Second, only if there is
a perceived threat to this freedom of choice, reactance can occur.
According to Brehm and Sensenig (1966, p. 703), “When a person
is free to choose between two alternatives, any attempt by another
person to inﬂuence his choice should be perceived as a threat to
his freedom.” Thus, if the patient notices that Dr. Boston tries to
inﬂuence him, the patient perceives a threat to his freedom.
When people try to inﬂuence someone, they may have
manifold reasons for it. One reason for a social inﬂuence
attempt results from a vested interest. In general, a vested
interest is deﬁned as a hedonically relevant attitude object
which has important perceived personal consequences for the
attitude holder (Crano and Prislin, 1995). The more important
the attitude object, the more likely is the attitude expressed
in one’s behavior. In many cases, this vested interest is of
ﬁnancial nature. A study by Jones et al. (2014) explored how
the explicit mentioning of a ﬁnancial interest of a salesperson
inﬂuenced the clients’ satisfaction with their purchase. They
manipulated vested interest by salespersons urging customers to
evaluate their purchase most positive in order to minimize the
risk of decreasing the salesperson’s compensation. If this vested
interest was present, participants indicated lower satisfaction
with their purchase than if no vested interest was present.
Similarly, Wicklund et al. (1970) demonstrated that sunglasses
sold by a salesperson with a ﬁnancial interest were liked less
than sunglasses sold by a salesperson with no ﬁnancial interest.
Thus, people’s perception of a vested interest of a salesperson
resulted in downgrading the purchase. Such a change in the
attractiveness of an object, opinion, or message is an important
cognitive indicator of reactance (e.g., Brehm, 1966; Brehm and
Brehm, 1981; Laurin et al., 2012). In the studies described
above (Wicklund et al., 1970; Jones et al., 2014), people showed
reactance after they had perceived a vested interest of their
interaction partner.
As research on attitude change suggests, people with vested
interests are perceived as less trustworthy (for an overview
see Eagly and Chaiken, 1993). In two studies, Jodlbauer and
Jonas (2011) found that clients, who perceived self-interested
intentions of their advisors, trusted them less which in turn
decreased their willingness to accept the advice. Thus, we
expect mistrust to explain why vested interests arouse a feeling
of being threatened and why this feeling results in reactance
eﬀects.
The Present Research
In the present studies we explore how self-interested behavior
can aﬀect the dynamics of social interactions. Therefore, we split
up the reactance process into its single stages (experience of
reactance, aggressive behavioral intentions, and biased cognitions
in the form of negative attitudes toward the threatener and
a change in attractiveness of the imposed and non-imposed
options). In two studies we explored these stages in an advisor–
client context by presenting a ﬁctitious doctor–patient paradigm
to participants in which they imagined themselves being in the
position of either a patient who sought medical advice from a
doctor or being in the position of a doctor treating a patient. In
the neutral paradigm the interaction partner (either the doctor
or the patient) was very open to any kind of medication. In
the vested-interest paradigm, the interaction partner (either the
doctor or the patient) had a ﬁnancial interest and forced the other
person to take/recommend the depot medication. We predicted
that after reading the vested-interest paradigm, people would
show more mistrust, reactance-related experience, behavior, and
cognition than after reading a neutral paradigm. In addition, we
predicted that people in the role of a client would react with
stronger reactance than people in the role of an advisor. In their
role as experts advisors are usually less dependent on the clients
than the clients are on them. That is clients are subject to a higher
partner control and thus, advisors have power over the clients
(Thibaut and Kelley, 1959; Kelley and Thibaut, 1978; Kelley
et al., 2003). In the example of the doctor–patient interaction, the
patient would suﬀer more than the doctor from a vested interest
because the patient’s health depends on the doctor’s advice. Thus,
the patient experiences a realistic threat – an actual danger to
his health. A vested interest may additionally be experienced as a
threat to one’s freedom to decide for oneself. This should result
in a higher defensiveness of a patient compared to a doctor.
In addition, if advisors do not have any incentive to appear in
a positive light, they seem to be more accuracy-motivated and
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thus, not as biased as clients or personal decision makers (Jonas
and Frey, 2003; Jonas et al., 2005). Therefore, a doctor should
feel less aﬀected by a patient’s attempt to threaten the doctor’s
freedom.
In both studies, treatment of the participants was in
accordance with the ethical standards of the American
Psychological Association (APA). Participants were informed
that there were no right or wrong answers to the questions,
that the data would be treated conﬁdentially and anonymously,
and that drawing any personal reference from it would not be
possible. In order to assure anonymity, participants were not
asked for information that allows inferences to the participants
(e.g., names). Participants were aware that they could withdraw
from the online-study at any time. Participants were also
provided with the name and email address of the responsible
investigator. At the end of the survey, participants were thanked
for their participation and provided with contact details if they
wished to address any questions about the purpose of the study.
They also received course credits if desired.
STUDY 1
In Study 1 we investigated individuals’ mistrust toward their
interaction partner, their experience of reactance, their aggressive
behavioral intentions, and their biased cognitions in a ﬁctitious
doctor–patient interaction. We further examined whether
mistrust toward their interaction partner causes the emerging
reactance process. Therefore, we developed scenarios in which
people imagined being in the position of a protagonist whose
interaction partner shows self-interested behavior. We address
the following assumptions:
Mistrust and Reactance – Main Effects
Firstly, we predicted that after a vested interest of the interaction
partner, one perceives the partner as highly untrustworthy, i.e.,
s/he experiences strong mistrust toward the interaction partner
(see Eagly and Chaiken, 1993; Jodlbauer and Jonas, 2011).
Second, we hypothesized that a vested interest is experienced as
a threat to one’s freedom (see Wicklund et al., 1970; Jones et al.,
2014). This means that, compared to no vested interest, a vested
interest leads participants to experience more reactance, reveal
more aggressive behavioral intentions, and show more biased
cognitions, i.e., they have more negative attitudes toward their
interaction partner and rate the issue that has been imposed on
them less attractive.
Reactance – Interaction Effects
As people in the role of clients are ﬁrst, subject to a higher partner
control (see Thibaut and Kelley, 1959; Kelley and Thibaut, 1978;
Kelley et al., 2003) and second, have been shown to defend their
own position more strongly than people in the role of advisors
(see Jonas and Frey, 2003), we predicted that in the current study
patients who face a vested interest of their doctor experience more
reactance, reveal more aggressive behavioral intentions, and have
more biased cognitions than doctors who face a vested interest of
their patient.
Dynamic Development – Mediation
Effects
Mistrust should instigate a reactance process to evolve. Therefore,
we predicted that people’s perception of mistrust mediates the
relationship between a vested interest and people’s experience
of reactance, which further shades into aggressive behavioral
intentions and ﬁnally results in people’s long-term biased
cognitions. Summarized, the single threat stages should cause the
development of the dynamically developing reactance process.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants and Design
Eighty-two students (57 women, 24 men, 1 unspeciﬁed;
Mage = 23.84 years, SD = 7.18) from the University of Salzburg
were asked to read one of four paradigms in which they either
were asked to empathize with the role of a doctor (advisor) or
with the role of a patient (client). They received either a scenario
in which their interaction partner showed a vested interest or
a neutral scenario. Thus, the experiment was based on a two
(interest: vested interest vs. neutral) × two (role: doctor vs.
patient) between-subjects design.
Materials and Procedure
The online questionnaire ﬁrst gave general information about
the study and obtained some demographic information. After
reading short information about schizophrenia, participants
rated two types of medication (depot injection vs. pills) for the
treatment of schizophrenia in their attractiveness [scale from 1
(not at all attractive) to 10 (very attractive)]. Participants were
randomly assigned the role of a doctor or a patient and asked to
read one of two paradigms. Afterwards, they answered questions
concerning their mistrust toward the interaction partner, their
experience of reactance, their aggressive behavioral intentions,
and their biased cognitions [scales from 0 (not at all attractive) to
10 (very attractive)]. At the end of the survey, participants were
thanked for their participation and provided with contact details
if they wished to address any open questions about the purpose
of the study. They also received course credits if desired.
Paradigms
The paradigms consisted of a consultation situation. One group
of participants empathized with the role of a doctor who had
to decide between recommending either a depot injection or
pills for treating their schizophrenia patient M. Schneider. In the
neutral scenario patient M. Schneider was described as being very
friendly and open to information about both types of medication.
In the vested-interest scenario patient M. Schneider was only
interested in being recommended the depot. He mentioned that
he collaborated with a pharmaceutical company which produced
the depot and that he would therefore have ﬁnancial advantages.
He forced participants in the role of the doctor to recommend
the depot. Thus the consulting seemedmore like a justiﬁcation of
M. Schneider’s already taken decision.
The other group of participants empathized with the role of
the schizophrenia patient M. Schneider who had to decide which
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type of medication (depot injection vs. pills) he would choose. In
the neutral scenario the doctor Dr. Müller was described as very
friendly and explained the advantages and disadvantages of both
types of medication. In the vested-interest scenarioDr. Müller was
only interested in recommending the depot. He mentioned that
he collaborated with the pharmaceutical company producing the
depot and that he would therefore have ﬁnancial advantages.
Questionnaire – Reading Check, Mistrust, and
Reactance
To check whether people had read the scenarios thoroughly
we assessed whether they ascribed to the doctor/patient
a personal interest in recommending/receiving the depot
or the pills (reading check – personal interest depot; “Do
you believe the doctor/patient is personally interested in
recommending/receiving the depot?”; reading check personal
interest pills: Do you believe the doctor/patient is personally
interested in recommending/receiving the pills?”). After the
paradigm we assessed participants’ mistrust toward their
interaction partner (seven items; α= 0.90; e.g., “Do you think that
the doctor/patient has made his or her decision already before
the consultation?”). Then, participants indicated their experience
of reactance1 (Sittenthaler et al., 2015; four items; α = 0.96; e.g.,
“To what extent do you perceive the behavior as a restriction
of freedom?,” “How much does the doctor’s/patient’s behavior
bother you?”). We also assessed people’s aggressive behavioral
intentions (three items; α = 0.84; e.g., “How likely are you to
describe this doctor as incompetent to other patients?/How likely
are you to describe this patient as stubborn to colleagues?”). To
assess participants’ biased cognitions, we asked them to indicate
their attitude toward the interaction partner (negative attitudes;
two items, r = 0.462; e.g., “Do you think that this doctor/patient
could have prejudices against mentally ill people?”). Moreover,
before and after participants read the scenarios, we assessed the
attractiveness of the depot and pills medication. For analyzing
people’s judgment of attractiveness of the imposed and non-
imposed medication, we took the diﬀerence score between
attractiveness of the depot or the pills after minus before reading
the scenario with negative scores indicating a lower attractiveness
of the medication after the scenario.
RESULTS
Reading Check
To assure that participants had read the scenarios thoroughly, we
computed a diﬀerence score between personal interest in depot
and personal interest in pills with positive scores indicating a
higher interest in the depot compared to the pills medication. The
univariate analysis of variance (ANOVA) with interest (vested
1Originally, our reactance measure consisted of 18 items. A study validating
this measure (Sittenthaler et al., 2015) reduced the scale to a 10 items measure
and conﬁrmed a three-factor structure consisting of experience of reactance (four
items), aggressive behavioral intentions (three items), and negative attitudes (three
items). In the current article, we only report the validated scales.
2Due to a reliability of α = 0.58 with three items we excluded the item “Do you
think that the doctor/patient shows a similar behavior in other areas?”
interest vs. neutral) and role (doctor vs. patient) as independent
variables and the diﬀerence score as dependent variable showed
a signiﬁcant main eﬀect for interest, F(1,78) = 94.82, p < 0.001,
η2 = 0.55. Participants in the vested-interest condition who had
been imposed the depot were indeed more strongly convinced
that their interaction partner was personally interested in
recommending or receiving the depot over the pills (M = 6.63,
SD = 2.68), while participants in the neutral condition were
convinced that their interaction partner was more or less equally
interested in both medications (M = 1.20, SD = 2.46). Thus,
we can conclude that people realized the threatening partner’s
intentions. Furthermore, the main eﬀect for role was signiﬁcant,
F(1,78) = 4.63, p = 0.034, η2 = 0.06, indicating that participants
in the role of patients were in general more strongly convinced
that the doctor was personally interested in recommending the
depot over the pills (M = 4.50, SD = 3.90) than vice versa
(M = 3.30, SD = 3.52). The interaction between interest and role
was not signiﬁcant, F(1,78)< 1, p = 0.444, η2 < 0.01.
Mistrust and Reactance
We tested our predictions that ﬁrst, threatened participants
experience strong mistrust toward the interaction partner,
second, that in general threatened participants show more
reactance (experience of reactance, aggressive behavioral
intentions, negative attitudes) than non-threatened participants,
and third, that especially participants in the role of threatened
patients experience the most reactance (experience of reactance,
aggressive behavioral intentions, negative attitudes). We ran
a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) with interest
(vested interest vs. neutral) and role (doctors vs. patients) as
independent variables and mistrust, the three reactance scales,
and the two attractiveness ratings as dependent variables.
First, for mistrust, the analyses revealed a signiﬁcant main
eﬀect for interest, F(1,78) = 268.95, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.78. This
indicates that participants in the vested-interest group perceived
more mistrust toward their interaction partner than participants
in the neutral group (M = 8.37, SD = 0.97 vs. M = 4.06,
SD = 1.56) which supports our hypothesis. Furthermore, the
main eﬀect for role was signiﬁcant, F(1,78) = 16.58, p < 0.001,
η2 = 0.18, indicating that in general, participants in the role of
patients perceived more mistrust than participants in the role
of doctors (M = 6.74, SD = 2.44 vs. M = 5.67, SD = 2.51).
The interaction between interest and role was not signiﬁcant,
F(1,78)< 1, p = 0.491, η2 < 0.01.
Second, for reactance, theMANOVA revealed signiﬁcant main
eﬀects for the factor interest on the scales experience of reactance,
F(1,78) = 101.06, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.56, aggressive behavioral
intentions, F(1,78) = 33.61, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.30, negative
attitudes, F(1,78) = 17.76, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.19, and people’s
judgment of the attractiveness of the depot, F(1,78) = 4.23,
p = 0.043, η2 = 0.05. However, people’s judgment of the
attractiveness of the pills was not signiﬁcant, F(1,78) < 1,
p = 0.520, η2 = 0.01. Thus, the vested interest evoked more
reactance than the neutral condition (experience of reactance:
M = 6.82, SD = 2.67 vs. M = 2.36, SD = 2.23; aggressive
behavioral intentions: M = 4.20, SD = 2.17 vs. M = 1.80,
SD = 1.89; negative attitudes: M = 5.98, SD = 1.73 vs.M = 4.37,
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SD = 1.80; attractiveness of depot after minus before: M = −0.27,
SD = 2.68 vs. M = 0.88, SD = 2.33; attractiveness of pills after
minus before:M = −0.27, SD = 2.87 vs.M = −0.61, SD = 2.17).
The results support our hypotheses.
Furthermore, the analyses revealed signiﬁcant main eﬀects for
role on most of the scales, indicating that in general, participants
in the role of patients show more experience of reactance
(M = 5.94, SD = 3.38 vs.M = 3.17, SD = 2.61), F(1,78) = 39.46,
p < 0.001, η2 = 0.34, more aggressive behavioral intentions
(M = 3.81, SD = 2.59 vs.M = 2.15, SD = 1.75), F(1,78) = 16.05,
p < 0.001, η2 = 0.17, and more negative attitudes (M = 5.60,
SD = 1.92 vs. M = 4.73, SD = 1.88), F(1,78) = 5.07, p = 0.027,
η2 = 0.06, than participants in the role of doctors. We did not
ﬁnd a signiﬁcant main eﬀect for role on people’s judgment of the
attractiveness of both medications, Fs(1,78) ≤ 1.86, ps ≥ 0.176,
η2s ≤ 0.023.
The MANOVA also revealed a signiﬁcant interaction
between interest and role for people’s experience of reactance,
F(1,78) = 4.14, p = 0.045, η2 = 0.05. Thus, patients in the
vested-interest condition experienced the most reactance toward
their interaction partner (for detailed results, see Table 1
and Figure 2). However, neither the interactions for people’s
aggressive behavioral intentions and people’s negative attitudes,
Fs(1,78)< 1, ps≥ 0.580, η2s< 0.01, nor for their judgment of the
attractiveness of both medications, Fs(1,78) ≤ 1.77, ps ≥ 0.187,
η2s ≤ 0.022, were signiﬁcant.
Dynamic Process – Mediation Effects
For testing the assumption that people’s perception of mistrust
causes a dynamic development of a reactance process, we
performed a serial multiple mediation analysis using the software
Process 2.11 (Hayes, 2013, model 6). The criterion for detecting
a serial multiple mediation was a signiﬁcant indirect eﬀect which
was computed using a 99% bias corrected bootstrap conﬁdence
interval (99% BCCI) and 10,000 bootstrap samples (Preacher and
Hayes, 2008). Regression analyses revealed that the vested interest
had a signiﬁcant total eﬀect on negative attitudes, b = −1.62,
SE = 0.39, t(80) = −4.14, p< 0.001. The eﬀect decreased to non-
signiﬁcance when the potential mediators mistrust, experience of
reactance, and aggressive behavioral intentions had been added
to the prediction, b = 0.12, SE = 0.65, t(80) = 0.18, p = 0.86.
The bootstrapped indirect eﬀect of vested interest on biased
attitude via mistrust, experience of reactance, and aggressive
behavioral intentions was signiﬁcant, b = −1.04, SE = 0.45, BC
CI [−2.91, −0.27]. In sum, the perception of mistrust resulting
from a vested interest translates into an increased experience
of reactance, which in turn leads to more aggressive behavioral
intentions and ﬁnally results in increased negative attitudes (for
the path coeﬃcients see Figure 3). This result supports our
hypothesis.
DISCUSSION
In Study 1, our goal was to investigate how individuals
in the role of doctors or patients react to vested interests.
We examined their mistrust, experience of reactance,
aggressive behavioral intentions, and biased cognitions after
their interaction partner forced them to choose the depot
injection instead of the pills medication. We further aimed
to investigate how and why the dynamic in this interaction
process develops. First, we found that participants who
had been imposed the depot, indicated more mistrust than
participants in a control group. Second, a serial multiple
mediation revealed that the vested interest caused a chain of
reactance reactions because it engendered mistrust toward the
interaction partner. This suggests that the perception of mistrust
signiﬁcantly contributes to the person’s experience, behaviors,
and cognitions and therefore to a dynamically developing
conﬂict-loop.
Maybe even more interesting, patients who had been
imposed the depot partly indicated a stronger experience of
reactance, more aggressive behavioral intentions, and more
biased cognitions than doctors who had been imposed the depot.
Derived from interdependence theory (Thibaut and Kelley, 1959;
Kelley and Thibaut, 1978; Kelley et al., 2003), we suggest that
this result can be explained by the diﬀerent partner control
of doctors and patients. Patients are usually more dependent
on the doctors than vice versa. This would mean that patients
experience a stronger threat if they perceive the doctor being
only interested in his/her own ﬁnancial beneﬁt but not in the
patients’ health. Moreover, advisors and clients have diﬀerent
roles. People who are in the role of advisors may not be as
concerned with their own decisions but may simply make a
professional recommendation for the client (Jonas and Frey,
2003). In doing so maybe they try to focus more on their clients’
wishes and needs than on their own. Thus, when threatened
by their patients, participants in the role of a doctor might
demonstrate less reactance what is important for the further
development of a trustful advisor–client relationship. This may
be the reasons why participants in the role of advisors seem to
behave in a less defensive manner than clients when confronted
with a threat.
However, is it really true that participants in the role of
advisors are less defensive than participants in the role of clients?
Or were our explicit measures just inappropriate to detect their
real reactions? What happens if we incorporate a more implicit
or indirect measure to detect reactance among participants in the
role of an advisor?
STUDY 2
In Study 2 we aimed to replicate the results of Study 1
indicating that advisors show less reactance than clients when
using explicit measures. In Study 1 we could also show
that threatened participants downgraded the depot which
indicates a lower interest in the imposed medication. This
change in people’s interest may also aﬀect their kind of
information search. Vested interests might also lead people
to become interested in learning more about or reading
more about the advantages than the disadvantages of the
restricted option and they might also become more interested
in further information about the disadvantages than about the
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TABLE 1 | Means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations for participants’ mistrust, experience of reactance, aggressive behavioral intentions, and
biased cognitions in Study 1.
M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6
(1) Mistrust All (N = 82) 6.22 2.52 –
Vested interest Doctors 7.91 1.07 –
Patients 8.80 0.63 –
Neutral Doctors 3.42 1.10 –
Patients 4.67 1.70 –
(2) Experience of reactance All (N = 82) 4.59 3.32 0.81∗∗ –
Vested interest Doctors 4.94 2.40 0.19 –
Patients 8.61 1.38 0.49∗ –
Neutral Doctors 1.40 1.28 0.68∗∗ –
Patients 3.27 2.57 0.68∗∗ –
(3) Aggressive behavioral intentions All (N = 82) 3.00 2.36 0.64∗∗ 0.77∗∗ –
Vested interest Doctors 3.25 1.78 0.03 0.55∗ –
Patients 5.11 2.15 0.43 0.22 –
Neutral Doctors 1.05 0.76 0.36 0.72∗∗ –
Patients 2.51 2.35 0.53∗ 0.83∗∗ –
(4) Negative attitude All (N = 82) 5.17 1.94 0.52∗∗ 0.57∗∗ 0.65∗∗ –
Vested interest Doctors 5.43 1.93 0.29 0.15 0.40 –
Patients 6.51 1.37 0.53∗ 0.30 0.48∗∗ –
Neutral Doctors 4.03 1.57 −0.11 0.07 0.22 –
Patients 4.68 1.98 0.42 0.67∗∗ 0.74∗∗ –
(5) Change in attractiveness+ – depot All (N = 82) 0.31 2.56 −0.19 −0.14 −0.10 −0.12 –
Vested interest Doctors −0.36 2.32 −0.32 0.33 0.26 −0.26 –
Patients −0.19 3.04 0.25 0.09 0.13 0.15 –
Neutral Doctors 1.10 2.13 −0.01 −0.11 −0.06 0.06 –
Patients 0.67 2.54 0.16 −0.22 −0.19 −0.04 –
(6) Change in attractiveness+ – pills All (N = 82) −0.44 2.53 −0.02 −0.08 0.08 0.19 −0.46∗∗ –
Vested interest Doctors 0.50 1.99 0.04 −0.21 0.12 0.44 −0.69∗∗ –
Patients −1.00 3.41 0.12 0.06 0.11 0.26 −0.62∗∗ –
Neutral Doctors −0.60 1.47 −0.46∗ −0.28 −0.18 0.12 −0.08 –
Patients −0.62 2.71 −0.22 −0.03 0.22 0.17 −0.26 –
Ratings were made on an 11-point scale. +The change in attractiveness values are the difference scores between the ratings made after minus before reading the
scenario with negative scores indicating a lower attractiveness of the medication after the scenario. ∗p < 0.05, two-tailed; ∗∗p < 0.01, two-tailed.
FIGURE 2 | Means and confidence intervals for participants’ experience of reactance, their aggressive behavioral intentions, and their negative
attitudes in Study 1. Simple-effects are marked with ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05, or (∗)p < 0.10.
advantages of the imposed option. Thus, Study 2 also included
a more indirect measure of reactance, people’s information
search.
Research has found that human information search is often
biased (Frey, 1986; Jonas et al., 2001). If people have made
a choice, they prefer information supporting their decision
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FIGURE 3 | The effect of freedom threat on negative attitudes via the perception of mistrust, experience of reactance, and aggressive behavioral
intentions. ∗∗p < 0.01.
over information opposing their decision, i.e., they reveal a
“conﬁrmation bias” (Jonas et al., 2001, p. 557). This phenomenon
has been explored in the context of dissonance theory (Festinger,
1957). Research suggests that when people make decisions for
themselves, they preferentially search for information supporting
their preliminary decision, which serves to reduce post-decisional
conﬂict. With regard to the information search among advisors,
research suggests that if advisors are led by accuracy motivation
they consider information supporting and contradicting their
initial recommendation in a more balanced way (Jonas and
Frey, 2003; Jonas et al., 2005). However, the conﬁrmation bias
increases for advisors if there is an incentive to justify their
position or appear in a positive light to the client (Jonas
et al., 2005). If advisors, on the other hand, are motivated to
avoid a wrong decision, they reveal another kind of bias: they
consider information contradicting their position more carefully
and even exhibit a disconﬁrmation bias (Jonas et al., 2005;
Mendel et al., 2009). Investigating the information search of
psychiatrists when considering the diagnosis of a patient, Mendel
et al. (2009) found that doctors informed themselves more
about the risks than about the beneﬁts of available treatment
options. This eﬀect can be explained by the doctor’s principle
of “primum non nocere” which is the motivation of avoiding
harm (Mendel et al., 2009) and indeed, the results showed that
the more the doctors investigated conﬂicting information the
higher the probability that they made the correct diagnosis,
whereas the probability of sticking to their wrong decision was
highest when they revealed a conﬁrmation bias (see also Kray,
2000).
We presented participants with information about the facts
of the imposed and non-imposed options and with information
about the person who showed a vested interest. Firstly, we
predicted that due to their professional role, doctors would
search for more information overall than patients (Kray, 2000;
Mendel et al., 2009). Secondly, we were interested in whether
doctors who are in a more powerful role than clients express
their experienced reactance in a more subtle way when they
have been facing a vested interest of their interaction partner.
Thus, we wanted to know if they show a conﬁrmation bias in
information search by preferring supporting information about
their initially recommended medication and non-supporting
information about the imposed medication.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants and Design
We had 225 participants who participated for course credit in an
online study. However, we needed to exclude the data of seven
participants because they correctly inferred the manipulation
and eleven because they indicated that they had been unable
to identify with the doctor or the patient in the scenario. Our
ﬁnal sample consisted of 207 students of the University of
Salzburg (143 women, 62 men, 2 unspeciﬁed;Mage = 25.07 years,
SD = 6.31). The experiment was based on a two (interest: vested
interest vs. neutral) × two (role: doctor vs. patient) between-
subjects design. Participants were instructed to take the role of
a doctor (advisor) or a patient (client) and were asked to read one
of four consultation paradigms described in Study 1.
Materials and Procedure
We again assessed participants’ experience of reactance,
their aggressive behavioral intentions, and biased cognitions
using the same items as in Study 1. Additionally to assess
whether participants searched for more information supporting
vs. conﬂicting with their initial decision preference, at the
beginning of the questionnaire we asked them to indicate
their spontaneous decision for one of the two medications
(depot vs. pills). After the questions regarding their
experience of reactance, aggressive behavioral intentions,
and biased cognitions we presented them information
concerning the treatment options and participants indicated
whether they wanted to read it in more detail or not (see
below).
Questionnaire – Reactance
Participants answered some items regarding their experience of
reactance (four items, α = 0.96), their aggressive behavioral
intentions (three items, α = 0.88), and their biased cognitions
(negative attitudes: two items3, r = 0.56; attractiveness of the
depot and the pills medication before and after the scenario:
each one item). All items ranged from 1 (not at all) to 10 (very
much).
3Because of a bad overall reliability in Study 1, we deleted the item “Do you think
that the doctor/patient shows a similar behavior in other areas?”
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Information Search
Then we presented short statements concerning the advantages
and disadvantages of both medications. Each statement was
either a factual information or a person-related information
about the advantages or disadvantages of the medication (e.g.,
factual contra depot: “A patient survey showed: the depot
injection is often perceived as unpleasant and as evoking
anxiety.”; person-related (doctor) pro depot: “You hear that
patients’ feedback strongly aﬀect Dr. Boston’s work and that so far
she has always received positive feedback concerning the depot
injection.”). In sum, each participant read sixteen statements (two
factual advantages and two factual disadvantages of the depot,
two factual advantages and two factual disadvantages of the
pills, two person-related (doctor vs. patient) advantages and two
person-related disadvantages of the depot, two person-related
advantages and two person-related disadvantages of the pills4).
After reading each statement they indicated whether they wanted
to read it in more detail or not. Thus, the information search
consisted of the sum of statements they wanted to read more
about.
In the end, doctors gave their ﬁnal recommendation for a
medication and patients their ﬁnal decision for either the depot
injection or the pills. They indicated how well they could identify




Aiming to replicate the results of Study 1, we predicted that
individuals, especially patients, who face a vested interest of their
interaction partner, reveal more experience of reactance, more
aggressive behavioral intentions, and more biased cognitions,
than non-threatened individuals. The MANOVA with interest
4In a pretest we aimed to ﬁnd clear statements for the dimensions pro depot,
contra depot, pro pills, contra pills. Therefore, we asked 30 participants to
rate 24 short factual statements, and 20 short person-related (either doctor- or
patient-related) statements concerning their direction [scale from −5 (contra
depot/pills) to 5 (pro depot/pills)], persuasiveness, and relevance [scales from 0
(not at all) to 10 (very much)]. Based on the means we chose eight factual
statements and ran 2 (type of medication: depot vs. pills) × 2(information:
pro vs. contra) repeated measures ANOVAs with direction, persuasiveness, and
relevance separately. For the factual statements, we neither found signiﬁcant eﬀects
for direction, Fs(1,29) ≤ 2.78, ps ≥ 0.107, η2 ≤ 0.09, nor for persuasiveness,
Fs(1,29)< 1, ps ≥ 0.583, η2 ≤ 0.01. For relevance we found a marginal signiﬁcant
eﬀect for information, F(1,29) = 3.67, p = 0.065, η2 = 0.11, indicating that
participants ascribing a higher relevance to the pro (M = 7.48, SD = 0.24) than to
the contra information (M = 7.10, SD = 0.23). For the person-related statements,
we neither found signiﬁcant eﬀects for direction, Fs(1,13) ≤ 2.74, ps ≥ 0.122,
η2 ≤ 0.17, nor for persuasiveness, Fs(1,13) ≤ 3.18, ps ≥ 0.098, η2 ≤ 0.20, or
relevance, Fs(1,13) ≤ 2.01, ps ≥ 0.180, η2 ≤ 0.13. In sum, the statements did not
diﬀer from each other indicating that they were evaluated as clearly speaking for or
against the treatment with depot/pills (factual information: M = 3.42, SD = 0.81;
patient-speciﬁc information: M = 2.60, SD = 1.22; doctor-speciﬁc information:
M = 2.05, SD = 1.10), were clearly evaluated as persuasive (factual information:
M = 7.32, SD = 1.04; patient-speciﬁc information: M = 5.79, SD = 2.01; doctor-
speciﬁc information: M = 5.22, SD = 2.26), and were clearly evaluated as relevant
(factual information:M = 7.29, SD = 1.17; patient-speciﬁc information:M = 5.87,
SD= 2.06; doctor-speciﬁc information:M = 4.43, SD= 1.96). Thus, we used these
eight statements in the main questionnaire.
(vested interest vs. neutral) and role (doctors vs. patients) as
independent variables revealed signiﬁcant interactions on all
scales except of the attractiveness rating of the pills [experience
of reactance: F(1,203) = 24.22, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.11; aggressive
behavioral intentions: F(1,203) = 61.04, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.23;
biased cognition – negative attitudes: F(1,203)= 33.20, p< 0.001,
η2 = 0.14; biased cognition – change in attractiveness depot:
F(1,2025)= 7.30, p = 0.007, η2 = 0.04; biased cognition – change
in attractiveness pills: F(1,203) = 1.42, p = 0.234, η2 < 0.01].
Thus, we did not only ﬁnd a signiﬁcant interaction for experience
of reactance like in Study 1, but this time for the other scales
as well. Patients who had been imposed the depot indicated
the highest reactance. Furthermore, patients also revealed the
strongest decrease in the attractiveness of the imposed depot,
which conﬁrms our hypotheses (for detailed results, see Table 2
and Figure 4).
Dynamic Process – Mediation Effects
As the results of the mediation analyses from Study 1 suggest
the existence of a dynamic interaction process, we performed
a serial multiple mediation analysis (Process 2.11; Hayes, 2013,
model 6) also in Study 2. The criterion for detecting themediation
was a signiﬁcant indirect eﬀect which was again computed
using a 99% bias corrected bootstrap conﬁdence interval (99%
BC CI) and 10,000 bootstrap samples (Preacher and Hayes,
2008). Regression analyses revealed that the vested interest had a
signiﬁcant total eﬀect on negative attitudes, b= −3.77, SE= 0.34,
t(205) = −11.15, p < 0.001. The eﬀect decreased to non-
signiﬁcance when the potential mediators experience of reactance
and aggressive behavioral intentions had been added to the
prediction, b = −0.68, SE = 0.41, t(205) = −1.64, p = 0.102. The
bootstrapped indirect eﬀect of vested interest on biased attitude
via experience of reactance and aggressive behavioral intentions
was signiﬁcant, b = −1.36, SE = 0.34, BC CI [−2.32, −0.53].
Moreover, the bootstrapped indirect eﬀect of vested interest
on biased attitude via experience of reactance alone was also
signiﬁcant, b = −1.71, SE = 0.48, BC CI [−3.01, −0.53]. In sum,
the experience of reactance from a vested interest translates into
aggressive behavioral intentions and ﬁnally results in increased
negative attitudes (for the path coeﬃcients see Figure 5). This
result again supports our hypothesis of a dynamic development
of the reactance process.
Information Search
First, we tested the prediction that due to their professional
role, doctors search for more information than patients. The
ANOVA with role (doctors vs. patients) as independent variables
and the sum of all information as dependent variable revealed
a signiﬁcant main eﬀect for role on people’s general interest in
information, F(1,205)= 11.23, p= 0.001, η2 = 0.06, with doctors
searching for more information than patients (M = 10.67,
SD = 4.05 vs.M = 8.86, SD = 3.72).
Second, we asked whether doctors who are confronted
with a vested interest of their patient express their reactance
in a subtle way by showing a conﬁrmation bias. According
5One missing.
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TABLE 2 | Means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations for participants’ experience of reactance, aggressive behavioral intentions, and biased
cognitions in Study 2.
M SD 1 2 3 4 5
(1) Experience of reactance All (N = 207) 4.75 3.23 –
Vested interest Doctors 5.41 2.39 –
Patients 8.45 1.38 –
Neutral Doctors 1.83 1.32 –
Patients 2.38 1.91 –
(2) Aggressive behavioral intentions All (N = 207) 3.30 2.50 0.84∗∗ –
Vested interest Doctors 3.00 1.59 0.60∗∗ –
Patients 6.39 1.87 0.54∗∗ –
Neutral Doctors 1.49 0.86 0.82∗∗ –
Patients 1.65 1.29 0.54∗∗ –
(3) Negative attitude All (N = 207) 5.27 3.06 0.75∗∗ 0.74∗∗ –
Vested interest Doctors 5.56 2.48 0.30∗ 0.27∗ –
Patients 8.34 1.99 0.50∗∗ 0.49∗∗ –
Neutral Doctors 3.61 2.09 0.46∗∗ 0.45∗∗ –
Patients 2.88 2.17 0.64∗∗ 0.62∗∗ –
(4) Change in attractiveness+ – depot All (N = 207) −0.67 2.26 −0.28∗∗ −0.32∗∗ −0.21∗∗ –
Vested interest Doctors 0.00 2.33 −0.18 −0.17 −0.19 –
Patients −1.95 2.12 −0.24 −0.15 −0.02 –
Neutral Doctors −0.09 1.74 −0.06 −0.04 −0.13 –
Patients −0.43 2.22 0.14 0.06 0.30∗ –
(5) Change in attractiveness+ – pills All (N = 207) −0.46 2.29 0.04 0.09 −0.07 −0.24∗∗ –
Vested interest Doctors −1.00 2.63 0.14 0.04 −0.19 −0.25 –
Patients −0.16 2.61 0.11 0.16 −0.11 −0.33∗ –
Neutral Doctors −0.39 1.87 −0.13 −0.12 0.01 −0.11 –
Patients −0.31 1.75 −0.05 0.12 −0.14 −0.10 –
Ratings were made on a 10-point scale. +The change in attractiveness values are the difference scores between the ratings made after minus before reading the scenario
with negative scores indicating a lower attractiveness of the medication after the scenario. ∗p < 0.05, two-tailed; ∗∗p < 0.01, two-tailed.
FIGURE 4 | Means and confidence intervals for participants’ experience of reactance, their aggressive behavioral intentions, and their negative
attitudes in Study 2. Simple-effects are marked with ∗∗p < 0.01.
to participant’s spontaneous decision for one of the two
medications in the beginning of the study, we ran two separate
repeated measures ANOVAs – one analysis for the sample
who chose to take the pills and who thus, may have been
most aﬀected by the imposition of the depot (N = 71,
“imposition group”), and one analysis for the sample who
chose to take the depot and who thus, may have been feeling
conﬁrmed in its decision (N = 136, “conﬁrmation group”).
To receive a score for the conﬁrmation bias, we calculated
a diﬀerence value between people’s interest in the number
of advantageous and disadvantageous pieces of information
chosen.
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FIGURE 5 | The effect of freedom threat on negative attitudes via experience of reactance and aggressive behavioral intentions. ∗∗p < 0.01.
Imposition Group
We inserted interest (vested interest vs. neutral) × role (doctor
vs. patient) as the between factors and the diﬀerences of the
medication (pills vs. depot) × type of information (factual vs.
personal) as within factors into a repeated measures ANOVA.
The four-way interaction was signiﬁcant, F(1,67) = 4.46,
p = 0.038, η2 = 0.06. Simple eﬀects indicated that doctors
in the vested-interest group, i.e., doctors who had been forced
to recommend the depot injection (but previously chose to
recommend the pills), committed a conﬁrmation bias concerning
the factual information: they devalued the imposed depot
by showing more interest in the disadvantages than in the
advantages of the depot (M = −0.73, SD = 0.88) but upgraded
the non-imposed pills by showing more interest in the advantages
than in the disadvantages of the pills (M = 0.27, SD = 0.70),
p< 0.001. This upgrading of the pills diﬀered from doctors in the
neutral group who devalued the pills by showing a higher interest
in disadvantages than in advantages of the pills (M = −0.31,
SD = 0.86), p = 0.061 (see Figure 6). This means that doctors
who had faced a vested interest of their interaction partner more
strongly conﬁrmed their decision for recommending the pills
than doctors who had not faced a vested interest.
With regard to the patients, both the vested-interest and the
neutral group devalued the depot (M = −0.46, SD = 0.74 and
M = −0.60, SD = 0.51) and upgraded the pills (M = 0.25,
SD = 0.93 and M = 0.33, SD = 0.49), p < 0.001 and
p = 0.001. This means that, independent of a vested interest
of their interaction partner, patients conﬁrmed previously made
decisions.
Summarized, a vested interest of the interaction partner only
aﬀected doctors but not patients. Doctors reacted to the threat by
conﬁrming their previously made decision.
Confirmation Group
We inserted interest (vested interest vs. neutral) × role (doctor
vs. patient) as the between factors and the diﬀerences of the
medication (pills vs. depot) × type of information (factual vs.
personal) as within factors into a repeatedmeasures ANOVA. The
four-way interaction was not signiﬁcant, F(1,132)< 1, p = 0.366,
η2 = 0.01. However, the analysis revealed two signiﬁcant three-
way interactions.
The three-way interaction between role, medication, and
type of information, F(1,132) = 4.34, p = 0.039, η2 = 0.03,
indicated that concerning the factual information, both doctors
and patients were more interested in the advantages of the pills
(doctors: M = 0.02, SD = 0.80; patients: M = 0.33, SD = 0.94)
than in the advantages of the depot (doctors: M = −0.52,
SD = 0.93; patients: M = −0.67, SD = 0.76), ps ≤ 0.001.
Furthermore, patients showed a higher interest in the advantages
of the pills (M = 0.33, SD = 0.94) than doctors (M = 0.02,
SD = 0.80), p = 0.041. Thus, the advantages of the pills were in
general more interesting for people than the advantages of the
depot.
The three-way interaction between interest, medication, and
type of information, F(1,132) = 5.36, p = 0.022, η2 = 0.04,
indicated that concerning the factual information, both the
vested-interest and the neutral group were more interested in
the advantages of the pills (vested interest: M = 0.15, SD = 0.92;
neutral:M = 0.19, SD= 0.84) than in the advantages of the depot
(vested interest: M = −0.44, SD = 0.78; neutral: M = −0.75,
SD = 0.91), ps < 0.001, and that the neutral group (M = −0.75,
SD = 0.91) was even more interested in the disadvantages of the
depot than the vested-interest group (M = −0.44, SD = 0.78),
p = 0.037. Thus, the advantages of the pills were in general more
interesting for people than the advantages of the depot.
Summarized, simple-eﬀects in the interactions indicate that all
groups (doctors, patients, vested-interest, and neutral group) that
previously chose the depot showed a higher interest in the factual
advantages of the pills than in the factual advantages of the depot
(for detailed results, see Figure 7). Although they had chosen the
depot, they were more interested in the advantages of their non-
chosen medication, i.e., the pills.6
DISCUSSION
First, Study 2 showed that patients who had been imposed a
medication indicated a stronger experience of reactance, more
aggressive behavioral intentions, and more biased cognitions
than doctors who had been imposed a medication. These
results that partly have also been found in Study 1 suggest
that patients are more aﬀected by the vested interest than
doctors.
Second, the ﬁndings of Study 2 indicate that doctors who have
not been imposed a medication, were in general more interested
6As with regard to personal information, people were in general more interested in
disadvantages of both medications (pills and depot), we do not report the detailed
analyses here.
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FIGURE 6 | Information search of participants of the imposition group, i.e., participants who chose to take the pills (N = 71) before the scenario.
FIGURE 7 | Information search of participants of the confirmation group, i.e., participants who chose to take the depot (N = 136) before the scenario.
in the disadvantages than the advantages of the medications
(see Figure 6). Thus, doctors may be careful when it comes to
the recommendation of a medication. However, when doctors
perceived a vested interest of their patients, they conﬁrmed their
previously made decision. They showed a higher interest in the
disadvantages of the imposed medication and in the advantages
of the non-imposed medication. Thus, doctors behaved like
patients who showed this conﬁrmation bias no matter if they
perceived a vested interest or not.
Thus, at ﬁrst sight when only looking at the direct measures
of reactance, it seems that doctors who are threatened by a
vested interest of their interaction partner are more objective
than clients, stay in their professional role, and do not defend
themselves. This may be due to the doctors’ professional role
in which they are able to distance from the decision problem
and are therefore not as impulsive as clients who are concerned
with their own decision. Interestingly, Study 2 provides a
more diﬀerentiated picture compared to Study 1: our data on
participants’ information search suggest that doctors in fact
show reactance but in a more subtle manner. If the depot
had been imposed they demonstrated a classical conﬁrmation
bias, i.e., they were more interested in disadvantages of the
depot and advantages of the alternative medication. However,
this conﬁrmation bias only emerged concerning the factual
information but not concerning the personal-related information
about the medication and emerged only in doctors and not in
patients. Why? Doctors may be more professional if a person
is involved. Thus, when it comes to expressing one’s own
experience, behaving in a reactant way, or getting informed about
the patient, doctors try to remain distanced and professional.
Patients, on the contrary, do not have to be professional but can
openly express their experience, behavior, and cognition.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The current research aimed to describe the dynamical
development of interactions between two or more persons. With
dynamical we mean subdividing the interaction process into its
single stages (motivational-aﬀective states, motivated cognitions,
and motivated behaviors, see Figure 1) and explaining how
people’s reactions in an interaction mutually aﬀect each other.
The two studies presented here investigated the single stages of
an emerging reactance process. After people who imagined being
a doctor vs. a patient had been threatened by a vested interest of
their interaction partner, we assessed their mistrust toward the
interaction partner, their experience of reactance, their aggressive
behavioral intentions, and their biased cognitions.
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In Study 1 we found that participants who had been imposed
a medication indicated more mistrust toward the interaction
partner than participants in a control group. A serial multiple
mediation revealed that the emerging mistrust triggered a
dynamically developing reactance sequence, starting from a high
experience of reactance entering aggressive behavioral intentions,
and ﬁnally ending in people’s biased cognitions. As we found
patients being more reactant than doctors we conducted Study
2, in which we aimed to explore the advisor’s weaker reactions to
the threat. To do so, in addition to the classic reactance measures
of Study 1, we employed an indirect measure of reactance –
people’s information search concerning the imposed and the
non-imposed medication. The results of Study 2 suggest that
doctors show reactance in a subtle way. If the depot had been
imposed on them, they were more interested in disadvantages of
the depot and advantages of the alternative medication. Patients
also showed this conﬁrmation bias but independent of a vested
interest. They always conﬁrmed their previously made decisions.
These results suggest that while patients disclose their
reactance, doctors show reactance in a more subtle way. The
reason for this may be that doctors are less dependent on the
patient than vice versa. In terms of interdependence theory (e.g.,
Kelley et al., 2003), they are subject to less partner control than
patients are and thus, have also more power over the patient. The
second reason for this may be their professional role, in which
they need to remain objective and unbiased. However, especially
Study 2 shows us that remaining unbiased after being threatened
in one’s freedom is not as easy as it seems. If you take a more
thorough look, then even doctors who seem to be very objective
at ﬁrst sight are aﬀected by their patient’s attempt to threaten their
freedom.
Theoretical and Practical Implications
With the current research we tried to investigate how interactions
develop dynamically when a threat happens. Although a bunch
of studies investigates how threats in social interactions aﬀect
motivation, cognition, and behavior, most of them miss the
crucial step of linking them and thus showing how they mutually
aﬀect each other. However, if we aim to understand how
interactions develop, we need to have a look at how one process
inﬂuences another one. Inspired by interdependence theory (e.g.,
Kelley et al., 2003), we split the interaction process into its
single stages. Going beyond interdependence theory, we further
explored how the single stages mutually inﬂuence each other.
This approach may help to better comprehend why interactions
do not always run smoothly but sometimes provoke conﬂicts.
Following the recommendation of Miron and Brehm (2006,
p. 16) to “consider the various implications of the theory
for real world phenomena as well as continue revealing and
testing its basic theoretical assumptions,” we presented evidence
that freedom threats in social interactions may have serious
consequences. Therefore, our results are not only important for
science but also for our everyday lives. Keeping in mind that
threats do not only lead to sudden behavioral reactions but also
to long-term biased cognitions, one can better understand own
and other’s reactions. This can further contribute to taking action
resolving own prejudices against others and other’s prejudices
against oneself. Simply knowing how a threat can escalate into
a conﬂict spiral provoking defensive actions and reactions would
be the ﬁrst step for the development of possible interventions.
Although the patient’s behavior is the only part visible for the
doctor, the reactant patient additionally has speciﬁc cognitions
and reasoning processes not visible for the doctor. However,
those biased cognitions regarding both, cognitions about the
interaction partner and cognitions about oneself and one’s
attitudes, are important to consider. Therefore, the patient may
derogate the doctor and assume that the doctor has prejudices
against all mentally ill people. According to reactance theory,
the threatened person (the patient), may also downgrade an
imposed medication that he previously preferred and upgrade
a not imposed medication that he previously rejected (see
also, e.g., Bushman and Stack, 1996; Dillard and Shen, 2005;
Bijvank et al., 2009). Our results extend reactance theory by
showing that biased cognitions can also be found in threatened
people’s information search. We presented evidence that doctors
displayed higher interest in information of the non-imposed
medication compared to a lower interest in information of the
imposed medication.
Limitations and Future Research
A limitation of our studies is that we used scenarios in which
people were imagining being a doctor or a patient. Such
imaginations miss out the important real-life setting in which
doctors are committed to their profession and patients suﬀer
from a real disease. Although real-life settings would tell us even
more, we believe that these studies are ﬁrst steps into exploring
interaction processes developing out of freedom threats. Thus,
we found a chain of emerging stages that inﬂuenced each other –
a threat of one person to another person led to an experience
of mistrust, which further aroused an experience of threat and
intended behaviors to restore one’ freedom and ﬁnally resulted
in biased attitudes. Aside from that, it would be diﬃcult and
even unethical to manipulate freedom threats in a real doctor–
patient interaction. One could only try to observe interactions
like these and ﬁgure out where threats happen. However, it may
be worth to consider carrying out the same studies on a sample
of real advisors and real patients and not only on students.
Although we found that clients were very reactant if the doctor
threatened them in their freedom, this might not apply in all
situations. Consider a patient who is really afraid of dying and
knows he does not have much medical knowledge. He or she
would probably follow the doctor’s orders without experiencing
reactance.
Although one would assume that doctors could not be
threatened in a realistic way because they do not have a direct
beneﬁt from prescribing the depot or not, our results show
that doctors are threatened as well but they suﬀer to a lower
degree than patients. The reason for this might be their lower
dependence on the interaction partner. This means that the
doctor is not as dependent on the patient as vice versa. If
the patient, however, recognizes that the doctor is not really
interested in the patient’s health but only in her own ﬁnancial
beneﬁt, the patient experiences a very strong threat. Besides his
health being threatened, the vested interest of the doctor can also
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pose a psychological threat. The patient may also feel threatened
in his motive of being free to decide for himself. However, as the
doctor is not as dependent on the patient, she might not be as
aﬀected. Still, the doctor might be threatened in his motive of
being free to advice the medication he wants to advice. The result
that doctors experience a threat as well is in line with reactance
theory stating that social inﬂuence attempts targeting a speciﬁc
individual can pose a freedom threat (Brehm, 1966; Brehm and
Sensenig, 1966; Clee and Wicklund, 1980; Brehm and Brehm,
1981). We believe that the doctors’ and patients’ diﬀerent amount
of partner control that might cause the diﬀerent degrees of threat
would be a valuable question for future research.
CONCLUSION
Dealing with freedom threats that happen in our everyday
interactions, the present research broadens our understanding
of how social interactions develop – from experiencing
mistrust toward the interaction partner to experiencing a
strong threat, to further being motivated to restore one’s
scope of action and ﬁnally developing biased cognitions.
Our results open up possibilities on how social interactions
might be viewed in a dynamical sense. Research investigating
social interaction may thus pay more attention to this
dynamic.
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